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The Merchant-Diplomat in Comparative Perspective: Embassies to the Court of 
Aurangzeb, 1660-1666 
Guido van Meersbergen 
 
Introduction 
At daybreak on 13 August 1662, in the midst of Northern India’s monsoon season, the Dutch 
envoy Dircq van Adrichem (1629-1665) made his way to Delhi’s Hall of Public Audience 
(Diwan-i-Am or Am-Khas to appear before Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707), the reigning Mughal 
emperor  As the heavy rain, which had commenced the previous night, continued unabated, 
the envoy and his modest entourage faced the difficult task of reaching the imperial palace 
without soaking their clothes and spoiling the gifts they carried. Failing to appear at the 
appointed time would harm the interests of his employer, the Dutch East India Company 
(Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC), hence Van Adrichem steered his horses, carts, 
and palanquins through Delhi’s mud-covered streets. Having entered the Red Fort, the 
ambassador was brought to Iftikhar Khan, the imperial stable master (Akhtah Begi) on whom 
the Dutch relied for assistance. After about half an hour, news reached Van Adrichem that the 
bad weather compelled Aurangzeb to stay indoors. The monarch was still recovering from the 
illness that had struck him some months earlier.
1
 This scenario repeated itself twice over the 
next month, so that it was not until mid-September that the envoy obtained the desired first 
audience, five weeks after arriving in Delhi.
2
 
                                                          
1
 A. J. Bernet Kempers (ed.), Journaal van Dircq van Adrichem’s Hofreis naar den Groot-Mogol Aurangzēb 
1662 (The Hague, 1941) (Journaal), pp. 130-1. 
2
 Ibid., pp. 144-8, 160-2. See also J. A. van der Chijs et al. (eds.), Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia 
vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India, 31 vols. (The Hague/Batavia, 1887-1931) 
(DRB), 1663, pp. 294-306. This embassy is also discussed in Frank Birkenholz’ contribution to this volume. 
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By analysing Van Adrichem’s embassy to the court of Aurangzeb, this chapter sheds light on 
three inter-related aspects: cross-cultural diplomacy, the significance of merchants as 
interlocutors in early modern inter-state relations and the VOC’s place in the Mughal political 
landscape. The picture that emerges from Van Adrichem’s embassy journal is not that of 
inter-state diplomacy based on reciprocal exchange. The diplomat made no attempt to assert 
his sovereign’s right to be treated as an equal member in a society of princes, as did, for 
example, the English ambassadors Sir Thomas Roe and Sir William Norris during their 
missions to the Mughal court.
3
 As symbolized by the repeated deferral of the envoy’s 
audience, the Dutch in Mughal India ranked low as diplomatic partners. Yet as armed 
merchants dwelling in Mughal domains they were familiar with imperial politics and culture 
in a way that royal ambassadors arriving from Europe were not.
4
 By examining how Dutch 
missions were embedded in a larger configuration of social and political interactions at 
international, regional and local levels, the VOC’s idiosyncratic position in Mughal India as 
inhabiting a grey area between minor foreign power and unorthodox domestic player becomes 
clear.  
 
This essay uses the term ‘merchant-diplomat’ to highlight the distinctive role of commercial 
agents in structuring exchanges between early modern polities, underscoring the significance 
of non-ambassadorial actors brought to light by the New Diplomatic History. The greater 
facility with which merchants could operate in diplomatic settings in the absence of, or 
unrestrained by, formalised inter-state relations and their accompanying protocol has been 
                                                          
3
 W. Foster (ed.), The embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India, 1615-1619: as narrated in his journal and 
correspondence (London, 1926), pp. 139-40; H. Das, S. C. Sarkar (eds.), The Norris embassy to Aurangzib 
(1699-1702) (Calcutta, 1959), pp. 272-3, 
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emphasized by a number of recent studies and was already recognized by contemporaries.
5
 As 
Roe informed the East India Company (EIC) in 1616, a ‘meaner agent’ was likely to carry out 
diplomacy in Mughal India more effectively than he could himself without running the risk of 
compromising the honour of his sovereign.
6
 The corporations the merchants served have also 
received new attention as diplomatic actors, either as state-like organizations acting by proxy, 
or as states in their own right.
7
 As a recent argument has it, corporations such as the VOC 
‘proved more agile transnational interlocutors than the states who authorized them because of 
their ability to become willing tributaries to foreign states’.8 Extending the gaze to Asia and 
fully integrating trading companies into the broad spectrum of state and non-state actors 
engaged in diplomatic exchange has clear potential for further enriching the inclusive 
perspectives on the transcultural ‘co-production’ of early modern diplomatic practices 
recently elaborated in the Mediterranean context.
9
 The VOC’s multifaceted diplomatic 
relations reveal how European merchant-diplomats adapted to and were incorporated into a 
set of distinct yet partially overlapping diplomatic networks, from posing as indigenized 
                                                          
5
 For other examples, see J. E. Wills Jr., Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese envoys to K’ang-hsi, 
1666-1687 (Cambridge, MA, 1984); L. Blussé, ‘Peeking into the empires: Dutch embassies to the courts of 
China and Japan’, Itinerario, 37.3 (2013), 13-29. 
6
 Foster, Embassy, p. 310. 
7
 For the latter, see P. J. Stern, The company-state: corporate sovereignty and the early modern foundations of 
the British Empire in India (Oxford, 2011). Also see Birkenholz’ chapter. 
8
 W. A. Pettigrew, ‘Corporate constitutionalism and the dialogue between the global and the local in 
seventeenth-century English history’, Itinerario, 39.3 (2015), 490. 
9
 M. van Gelder, T. Krstíc, ‘Introduction: Cross-confessional diplomacy and diplomatic intermediaries in the 
early modern Mediterranean’, JEMH, 19.2-3 (2015), 103. “Co-production” stresses the contributions made by a 
diverse range of actors to the wider development of diplomatic cultures. 
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‘merchant-kings’ in the Indonesian Archipelago to being subordinated as ‘obedient servant[s]’ 
in Tokugawa Japan.
10
 
 
Van Adrichem’s embassy reached Delhi in the midst of an extraordinary spell  of diplomatic 
activity following the Mughal war of succession of 1657-1659. In the space of five years 
(1660-1665), envoys from Basra, Balkh, Bukhara, Kashgar, Persia, Mecca, Yemen, 
Hadhramaut, and Abyssinia made their appearance at Aurangzeb’s court, while two French 
envoys arrived in 1666. This unique confluence of diplomatic missions invites us to compare 
Van Adrichem’s conduct and reception to those of other foreign envoys. Dutch diplomatic 
materials have long been relatively neglected even by VOC historians, and until now Van 
Adrichem’s mission remains primarily studied through the accounts of François Bernier, 
Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, and Niccolao Manucci.
11
 The analysis in this chapter rests on a 
contextual reading of Van Adrichem’s embassy journal and related documentation, which will 
be examined alongside the accounts of the aforementioned travellers and the principal 
chronicle of Aurangzeb’s reign, the Maasir-i-Alamgiri of Muhammad Saqi Must’ad Khan.12 
                                                          
10
 L. Blussé, ‘Queen among kings: diplomatic ritual in Batavia’, in K. Grijns, P. J. M. Nas (eds.), Jakarta-
Batavia: socio-cultural essays (Leiden, 2000), p. 31; A. Clulow, The company and the Shogun: The Dutch 
encounter with Tokugawa Japan (New York, 2014), p. 18. 
11
 See for instance A. Flüchter, ‘Der Herrscher grüßen? Grußpraktiken bei Audienzen am Mogolhof im 
europäischer Diskurs der Frühen Neuzeit’, in P. Burschel, C. Vogel (eds.), Die Audienz: Ritualisierten 
Kulturkontakt in der frühen Neuzeit (Cologne, 2014), pp. 17-56. Also see the confused analysis in G. Z. Refai, 
‘Foreign embassies to Aurangzeb’s court at Delhi, 1661-65’, in R. E. Frykenberg (ed.), Delhi through the ages: 
essays in urban history, culture, and society (Delhi, 1986), pp. 192-204. 
12
 M. Sāqī Mustaʿidd Khān, Maāsir-i-‘Alamgiri: A history of the Emperor Aurangzib-‘Alamgir (reign 1658-1707 
A.D.) of Sāqi Must’ad Khan, ed. J. Sarkar (Calcutta, 1947). Completed in 1710, for the first decade of 
Aurangzeb’s reign it relies on the Alamgir-namah, composed shortly after the events. 
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Seen through a comparative lens, the various embassies to Aurangzeb’s court provide an 
exceptional testing ground for hypotheses regarding early modern cross-cultural diplomacy.  
 
A previous generation of scholarship envisaged Mughal-European diplomatic encounters as 
hampered by misunderstanding and semiotic disconnect, in short as characterized by cultural 
incommensurability.
13
 The structuralist conception of culture as an internally-coherent and 
closed-off system of signs, which underlies this interpretation, has been rejected by recent 
commentators.
14
 Sanjay Subrahmanyam has cogently argued that the Ottoman, Safavid, and 
Mughal empires ‘belonged to overlapping cultural zones’, while early modern South Asian 
and European actors could create sufficient degrees of commensurability for cultural transfer 
to take place and relations to be mediated.
15
 Van Adrichem’s embassy substantiates the thesis 
of commensurability in Asian-European diplomatic exchange. Indeed, to analyse VOC 
diplomacy solely using the binary vocabulary of East-West encounters would be to miss the 
point that the Company’s diplomatic profile was constituted through, and deeply embedded 
in, the various diplomatic circuits dotting the Indian Ocean space.  
 
The Dutch Merchant-Diplomat in Mughal India 
The VOC’s presence in Mughal India originated in the early years of the seventeenth century 
and obtained a firmer footing during the latter half of Jahangir’s reign (1605-1627). By the 
                                                          
13
 B. S. Cohn, Colonialism and its forms of knowledge: the British in India (Princeton, NJ, 1996), p.18; K. 
Teltscher, India inscribed: European and British writing on India 1600-1800 (Delhi, 1995), p. 21. 
14
 C. Windler, ‘Diplomatic history as a field for cultural analysis: Muslim-Christian relations in Tunis, 1700-
1840’, HJ, 44.1 (2001), 94; P. Burschel, ‘Einleitung’, in P. Burschel, C. Vogel (eds.), Die Audienz: Ritualisierten 
Kulturkontakt in der frühen Neuzeit (Cologne, 2014), pp. 11-12; S. Subrahmanyam, Courtly encounters: 
translating courtliness and violence in early modern Eurasia (Cambridge MA, 2012), pp. 23, 30; 
15
 Ibid., pp. 6-7, 209. 
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1630s, Dutch trading operations were up and running throughout the western province of 
Gujarat and in the northern region around Agra, while the first inroads had been made further 
eastward in Bengal.
16
 For the right to establish factories, the settlement of import and export 
duties, and legal protection in Mughal domains, the Company depended on agreements with 
local governors and the central government. On their part, the Mughal administration 
benefited from increased tax income resulting from commercial expansion in its ports as well 
as from the influx of precious metals and foreign luxury goods. In addition, regulating 
relations with the various European ‘merchant-warriors’ was a means to curtail their 
predatory tendencies on the high seas and hence extend protection to Mughal subjects beyond 
the direct reach of the empire’s military power.17 This set of conditions formed the backdrop 
to all Mughal-Dutch diplomatic interactions. A crucial difference with Dutch diplomacy in 
North Africa and the Levant is that Dutch envoys in Mughal India and other parts of the 
Indian Ocean world acted on behalf of the VOC’s governor-general in Batavia (modern-day 
Jakarta), not the States-General of the United Provinces.
18
 Rather than aiming to establish 
                                                          
16
 H. Terpstra, De Opkomst der Westerkwartieren van de Oost-Indische Compagnie (Suratte, Arabië, Perzië) 
(The Hague, 1918); H. W. van Santen, De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in Gujarat en Hindustan, 1620-
1660 (Meppel, 1982). 
17
 The phrase is borrowed from: G. Winius, M. P. M. Vink, The merchant-warrior pacified: the VOC (The Dutch 
East India Company) and its changing political economy in India (Delhi, 1991). The Mughal government’s 
ability to curtail European predations remained partial, yet less ineffective than is sometimes suggested.  See A. 
Clulow, ‘European maritime violence and territorial states in early modern Asia, 1600-1650’, Itinerario, 33.3 
(2009), 72-94. Compare: O. Prakash, The new Cambridge history of India II.5: European commercial enterprise 
in pre-colonial India (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 143-6. 
18
 The VOC’s rights to independently carry on diplomatic negotiations, engage in warfare, and sign treaties with 
Asian rulers devolved from its founding charter granted by the States-General in March 1602. Even so, as 
discussed by Birkenholz in this volume, during the opening decades of the seventeenth century the States-
General and princes of Orange did occasionally participate in diplomatic communications with Asian rulers. On 
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bilateral treaties or contractual obligations – which would have been both foreign and 
offensive to the Mughal geopolitical outlook – the Dutch willingly posed as supplicants to the 
emperor soliciting his imperial commands (farmans).
19
 Such edicts were addressed to Mughal 
officials and other local power holders, and stipulated the privileges accorded to the ‘Dutch 
nation’ as a corporate group living within the Mughal realm, an arrangement similar to the 
rights enjoyed by European communities in Ottoman lands as expressed in the Sultan’s 
ahdnames.
20
  
 
In practice the durability and weight of the emperor’s ‘irrefutable commands’ had various 
limitations.
21
 The stipulations contained in a farman remained in force only until a new one 
superseded it. This circumstance led to considerable chagrin among European Company 
officials, although few commentators were as cynical as the English factors in Ahmadabad 
who sneered about ‘this Kinges firmaunes that hee gives when hee is drunck and denyes when 
hee is sober’.22 Since farmans expressed the will of the reigning monarch, they formally lost 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Dutch diplomacy in the Mediterranean see A. De Groot, The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic: a history 
of the earliest diplomatic relations, 1610-1630 (Leiden, 1978); M. Van Gelder, ‘The republic’s renegades: Dutch 
converts to Islam in seventeenth-century diplomatic relations with north Africa’, JEMH, 19.2-3 (2015), 175-98.  
19
 B.G. Fragner, ‘Farmān’, Enclyclopedia Iranica, online edition, 1999, available at 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/farman, accessed 29 March 2016. 
20
 D. Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and early modern Europe (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 183-8. For the text of 
farmans pertaining to Van Adrichem’s mission: J. E. Heeres, F. W. Stapel (eds.), Corpus Diplomaticum 
Neerlando-Indicum: Verzameling van Politieke Contracten en verdere Verdragen door de Nederlanders in het 
Oosten gesloten, van Privilegiebrieven, aan hen verleend, enz., 6 vols. (The Hague, 1907-1955), II, pp. 215-226. 
For ‘Nederlandse natie’, see p. 217  
21
 Ibid., II.223. 
22
 W. Foster (ed.), The English Factories in India 1618-1621 [to] 1668-1669. A calendar of documents in the 
India Office, British Museum and Public Record Office,13 vols. (Oxford, 1906-1927) (EFI), 1618-1621, p. 347. 
8 
 
their validity as soon as a new ruler succeeded to the throne. The need to have up-to-date 
decrees at their disposal when dealing with local authorities following imperial successions or 
conquest is what induced the VOC to fit out the embassies led by Van Adrichem (1662), 
Joannes Bacherus (1689), and Joan Josua Ketelaar (1711-1713). Yet their diplomatic efforts 
did not stop there, as the degree to which magistrates complied with the provisions made in 
farmans varied considerably. Complaints about this state of affairs were a recurring theme in 
VOC as well as EIC correspondence, such as in 1635, when the provincial governor of Bengal 
denied the VOC free trade under his jurisdiction in spite of Shah Jahan’s newly-granted 
farman.
23
 It was on account of their grievances with regard to being ‘vexed’ by lower-tier 
officials in their pursuit of profit that the bulk of VOC diplomacy in Mughal India was aimed 
at settling disputes that  had originated at the local and provincial levels.  
 
While having direct access to court was an important lever in negotiations with lower-level 
administrators, the Dutch played this trump card relatively sparingly because of the time and 
costs it required and their scepticism about the enforceability of imperial decrees. In 
December 1657, when rumours about Shah Jahan’s indisposition had already reached the 
VOC’s Hoge Regering (High Government) in Batavia, its members voiced their opinion that 
it was more profitable for the Company to win the favour of lesser magistrates than to lobby 
at the imperial court.
24
 Indeed, when looking back on their commissioning of Van Adrichem 
in August 1662, Joan Maetsuycker and his Councillors wrote that they would have shunned a 
mission if it had not been for the Mughal succession, emphasising that maintaining good 
working relations at the local level remained key: ‘no matter how favourable the king’s 
                                                          
23
 See DRB 1636, 123. 
24
 W. P. Coolhaas, J. van Goor, H. K. s’Jacob (eds.), Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden 
aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, 13 vols. (The Hague, 1960-2007), II.171, 190. 
9 
 
farmans obtained for the Company, ministers both high and low want to be acknowledged for 
obeying them’.25 In Bengal in particular, the Mughal viceroy (subahdar, often carrying the 
honorific title of nawab) held such power that most political negotiations were conducted at 
the provincial level. In addition to periodic formal gift offerings at the provincial court, the 
Company’s resident in Dakha paid informal visits to the subahdar perhaps as often as once a 
week, while everyday dealings were entrusted to unofficial intermediaries such as Dutch 
surgeons in Mughal service.
26
 One gets an impression of what provincial diplomacy might 
have looked like on the imposing canvas of the VOC’s factory in Hugli painted by Hendrik 
van Schuylenburgh (Fig. 9.1). It  is now increasingly becoming clear that the prominence of 
day-to-day informal diplomacy was due at least in part to the fact that many European traders 
and Mughal government officials were entangled in mutually-beneficial local alliances across 
cultural and institutional lines.
27
 
<FIGURE 9.1 HERE> 
 
The frequency of Dutch representations at the emperor’s abode was certainly much less. It 
may be presumed that Tavernier’s reference to ‘deputations and presents’ which the Dutch 
and English were ‘obliged to make every year at court’ reflected prescribed rather than actual 
practice.
28
 When the opperkoopman (senior merchant) Jan Tack made his appearance in 
                                                          
25
 Journaal, 27. 
26
 DRB 1661, p. 240. 
27
 F. Hasan, ‘Conflict and cooperation in Anglo-Mughal trade relations during the reign of Aurangzeb’, Journal 
of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 34.4 (1991), 351-60; B. Sur, ‘Institutional interests under the 
institutional façade: local agency in the Dutch East India Company’s legal system in 17th-century Bengal, 
Itinerario (forthcoming). Compare the argument about trans-imperial elite familiarity in David do Paço’s 
contribution to this volume. 
28
 J.-B. Tavernier, Travels in India, trans. V. Ball, ed. W. Crooke, 2 vols. (London, 1925), I.7. 
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recently completed Shahjahanabad in 1648, he was told by his patron at court, Haqiqat Khan, 
that ‘a king such as Shah Jahan merits more than one visit every three or four years’, hinting 
at the VOC’s sporadic attendance in years past.29 The nobleman recommended that the Dutch 
should present the emperor with fine pieces of broadcloth annually, yet such regularity was 
never met. For the thirty years prior to Van Adrichem’s mission, nine Dutch delegations to the 
Mughal court have been identified, namely those headed by Marcus Oldenburgh (1633), 
François Timmers (1635), Cornelis Weylandt (1642), Nicolaes Verburgh (1646), Jan Tack 
(1648, 1650, 1656, and 1660), and Johan Berckhout (1653).
30
 It is evident that Tack, who also 
participated as right-hand man in the expeditions of Weylandt, Verburgh, and Van Adrichem, 
was a key figure in the VOC’s diplomatic activity during his twenty-eight year-long stay in 
Agra. Van Adrichem’s embassy was followed by a lull in Dutch diplomacy at the imperial 
court, which coincided with Tack’s death in January 1663. During Aurangzeb’s long reign, 
the VOC dispatched only two further missions led by a Dutch agent, in 1677 and 1689.
31
 
 
What set Van Adrichem’s hofreis or court journey apart from all previous VOC delegations 
was its stately character and elaborate degree of organisation. Whereas seventeenth-century 
VOC diplomacy in the Mughal Empire was virtually always of an ad-hoc nature, carried out 
by one or two low-status envoys and coordinated by the Company’s administration in India 
itself, Van Adrichem travelled to Delhi as the director of Dutch trade in Surat and at the head 
of an embassy commissioned directly from Batavia. Having awaited the arrival of the ships 
                                                          
29
 Nationaal Archief, The Hague, 1.04.02 (VOC), 1168, fo. 627r. 
30
 Manuscript journals are available for the 1648, 1653, and 1656 missions: VOC 1168, 1201, 1210. For the 
other deputations, see VOC 1113, 1141, 1161; Corpus Diplomaticum, I.268-9; Journaal, pp. 4-11. 
31
 Both missions were led by Joannes Bacherus. See VOC 1323, 1329, 1475 and 1510.  
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carrying Japanese lacquer, Arabian horses, and other gifts for the emperor, Van Adrichem 
commenced his journey from Surat to Delhi on 22 May 1662.
32
 
 
To appreciate the role and status of the Dutch merchant-diplomats in Mughal India, Van 
Adrichem’s courtly venture should be regarded in the light of local Mughal-Dutch 
interactions. The Mughal war of succession had profound implications for the VOC in Gujarat 
and Bengal, as the crisis of imperial power at the centre produced fragmentation of authority 
locally. Whenever possible the VOC steered a course of neutrality, seeking to maintain the 
favour of power-holders nearby without exasperating the latter’s rivals further afield. Yet 
because the Company possessed two highly sought-after assets – money and armaments – it 
proved impossible to remain entirely on the sidelines. The plunder of the Dutch factory in 
Dhaka in 1659 in retaliation for material support offered to one of the warring parties 
represents just one of the possible repercussions of the VOC’s involvement as a commercial-
political actor in the Mughal political landscape.
33
  
 
Another concrete consequence was Aurangzeb’s appeal to the Dutch for assistance in seizing 
his fugitive brother, Shah Shuja.
34
 If this request was turned down politely on the pretext that 
capturing princes was no business for traders, there were other occasions on  which the land-
based empire did successfully co-opt the ambulant power of the merchant corporation. Such 
was the case with Aurangzeb’s call for maritime assistance against the Portuguese town of 
Daman on the west-Indian coast, issued in 1660. The Hoge Regering decided to supply 
warships for the purpose and capitalized on the issue in the diplomatic letter delivered by Van 
                                                          
32
 Journaal, pp. 36-8. 
33
 Generale Missiven, III.291, 300-2. 
34
 Journaal, p. 17. 
12 
 
Adrichem, although the scheme eventually failed to materialize.
35
 As in the case of  joint 
Mughal-Dutch operations that did come to pass – such as the modest naval support which the 
VOC supplied to nawab Shaista Khan in his campaign against Arakan (1665-1666) – 
Aurangzeb’s request regarding Daman is probably best seen as an appeal to a subordinate 
political actor to assist in frontier policing.
36
 Indeed, the available evidence suggests that 
members of the Mughal political elite viewed the various groups of armed European traders 
as minor political actors who represented a military potential to be restrained and if possible 
co-opted. The way Aurangzeb responded to the VOC’s request for reimbursement of costs 
incurred while preparing for the aborted campaign is indicative of the asymmetrical terms in 
which the diplomatic relationship was couched. The Dutch were told that the emperor 
recognized the service they rendered to him, but that they should regard it as compensation 
for the commercial favours they were liberally enjoying.
37
 The ceremonial framing of the 
VOC as a semi-domesticated foreign tributary by the Mughal government, and the symbolic 
assumption of this role by the Dutch, comes clearly to the fore when reading Van Adrichem’s 
mission against other diplomatic deputations to Aurangzeb’s court during the same period. 
 
Embassies to Aurangzeb’s Court (1660-1666) 
After his first audience in Delhi was postponed  for a second time, Van Adrichem turned to 
the young nobleman Sultan Muhammad to voice his discontent. Convinced that a speedier 
dispatch of his business should be possible, the Dutch envoy pointed out that he was well 
aware that Qasim Aqa, the ambassador from Basra on the Persian Gulf, had been promptly 
allowed to salute Aurangzeb and present his master’s gifts. Moreover, Van Adrichem 
                                                          
35
 DRB 1661, pp. 5-6, 156, 287. 
36
 For Shaista Khan’s campaign see J. Sarkar, History of Aurangzib: mainly based on Persian sources, 5 vols. 
(Calcutta, 1912-1924), III.133-41. 
37
 Journaal, p. 187. 
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continued, the emperor had received Qasim Aqa with considerable honour and courtesy, even 
if Husain Pasha, the semi-autonomous Ottoman governor of Basra, ‘could not contribute the 
least bit to the reputation of the Mughal crown, expansion of commerce in Surat, or the 
growth of the imperial treasury’.38 Whilst betraying an obvious mercantile bias as well as a 
limited appreciation of the repute and legitimacy that accrued to Aurangzeb’s reign through 
the public paying of respects by representatives from neighbouring Islamic regions, Van 
Adrichem’s comparison of the treatment received by the Dutch party with that accorded to 
other diplomats at the Mughal court is worth pursuing. The fact that we possess an 
exceptional archival record regarding a variety of diplomatic missions taking place at roughly 
the same historical juncture offers a unique opportunity to analyse European merchant-
diplomacy through a comparative and cross-cultural lens. 
 
According to Bernier, who served as a physician at the Mughal court in the 1660s, ‘little or no 
respect was paid’ to Qasim Aqa, while Manucci, who had served as a gunner in Prince Dara 
Shukoh’s army, recalled that the Basran embassy ‘made no great stir’.39 While the honours 
received by Qasim Aqa were modest indeed when seen in the light of the elaborate reception 
of Safavid ambassadors, the travellers’ remarks should be read in context. The Maasir-i-
Alamgiri of Muhammad Saqi Must’ad Khan, the principal chronicle of Aurangzeb’s reign, 
states that Husain Pasha’s envoy received an allowance of 4,000 rupees in Surat to facilitate 
his journey to Delhi, 5,000 rupees and a robe of honour (khil’at or sarapa) at his reception at 
court, as well as a further 12,000 rupees, a robe of honour, and a jewelled sword for his 
                                                          
38
 Ibid., p. 146. 
39
 F. Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire A.D. 1656-1668, trans. A. Constable, ed. V. Smith (London, 1914), p. 
133; N. Manucci, Storia do Mogor or Mogul India 1653-1708 by Niccolao Manucci Venetian, ed. W. Irvine,4 
vols. (London, 1907-1908),, II.115. given the page range you cited earlier, should this be 151? No, p. 115 is 
correct. I must have overlooked it when compiling the other footnote. 
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master upon his departure.
40
 In contrast, Van Adrichem received no financial allowance from 
the Mughal ruler, nor was he escorted to court like most of his west and central Asian 
counterparts, although he was given lodgings in Delhi and presented with several gifts. That 
the allegiance of a former Ottoman governor was of greater interest to Aurangzeb than the 
visit of a VOC envoy is demonstrated by the fact that, when Husain Pasha decided to migrate 
to Mughal India in 1669, he was escorted from Sirhind in the Punjab to Delhi, where he was 
graciously received in the Ghusl-Khana (Hall of Private Audience), offered a lakh (100,000) 
of rupees besides other gifts, and admitted into imperial service as a high-ranking officer.
41
 
 
The latter example has been discussed by Subrahmanyam to illustrate the relative ease with 
which a figure like Husain Pasha could move between the Islamicate states of Eurasia without 
encountering evident problems in adjusting to local forms of courtly ceremony and imperial 
administration.
42
 Although stemming from a cultural and diplomatic background that was 
evidently different from the Indo-Islamic point of view, as firangis (‘Franks’ or Europeans) 
the Dutch in India formed part of a clearly recognisable group within the seventeenth-century 
Mughal political landscape. Furthermore, as longer-term residents with everyday experience 
in dealing with the imperial administration from a position of relative weakness, Company 
envoys had a fair grasp of Mughal social and political etiquette and relatively few reservations 
about adapting to local conventions. Finally, as has been established for a number of different 
contexts, multiple structural commonalities and ‘interconnected repertoires’ existed between 
                                                          
40
 Maāsir-i-‘Alamgiri, pp. 20-2. 
41
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court cultures across Eurasia, enabling diplomatic actors to recognize and engage with (if not 
always fully appreciate) one another’s ceremonial language and symbolic practices.43 To 
assess the Dutch position within the diplomatic world of Mughal India, let us first turn 
towards this wider context.  
 
Having seized the throne through a fratricidal war fought during his father’s lifetime, 
Aurangzeb was keen to receive recognition of his accession through congratulatory embassies 
from neighbouring states.
44
 The main diplomatic partners of the Mughal Empire during Shah 
Jahan’s reign (r. 1628-1658) had been the Uzbek khanates of Bukhara and Balkh to the north 
and Safavid Iran to the northwest, in line with the empire’s primary geopolitical interests.45 
Besides regular interactions with states on the Indian Subcontinent, principally the Deccan 
sultanates of Bijapur and Golconda, the Mughals also maintained intermittent diplomatic 
contacts with the Ottoman Sultan. During Aurangzeb’s fifty-year-long reign, the only 
consistent factor in Mughal diplomacy was the relationship with the Uzbek states in central 
Asia, the ancestral domains of the Timurid dynasty and the location of Shah Jahan’s failed 
campaigns of the 1640s. Diplomatic exchange with the more distant Ottomans was limited to 
one unreciprocated embassy sent from Istanbul in 1690, while official relations with Persia 
broke off in 1666, when Aurangzeb received an insulting letter from Shah Abbas II.
46
 These 
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circumstances make the wave of diplomatic missions attending Aurangzeb’s court in the early 
1660s all the more remarkable. The most feasible comparison of these embassies, based on 
the available sources, is at the level of scale, reviewing the degree of material support and 
honour they received and the value of presents bestowed on them. These variables, which the 
Maasir-i-Alamgiri recorded for nearly all embassy parties, provide a fairly transparent 
yardstick by which to measure the relative importance which the imperial government 
attributed to its respective diplomatic relationships. 
 
Little is known about the first foreign emissary to present himself at Aurangzeb’s court, a man 
named Ibrahim Beg who was sent by the Uzbek ruler of Balkh, except that he died soon after 
his arrival in Delhi.
47
 Upon departure his companions were awarded robes of honour and 
20,000 rupees in cash. This was many times less than the 150,000 rupees spent on Khushi 
Bey, the ambassador from Balkh who visited Delhi in 1667, although considerably more than 
the modest sums granted to a succession of envoys of the Sharif of Mecca on three different 
occasions between 1665 and 1674.
48
 Nevertheless, the envoys from Mecca, like their 
counterparts from Yemen and Abyssinia, were publicly honoured on festive occasions such as 
Aurangzeb’s lunar birthday and the celebration of the end of Ramadan.49 Moreover, Mughal 
emperors regularly dispatched emissaries to the Arab Peninsula, carrying large financial 
donations to the Holy Cities, amounting to as much as 660,000 rupees in 1662, when 
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Aurangzeb successfully solicited the Sharif’s recognition of his reign.50 While the immediate 
geopolitical significance of diplomatic contacts with the minor states across the Arabian Sea 
was smaller than that of relations with his territorial rivals on India’s northern and western 
frontiers, such largesse was of evident importance to Aurangzeb in establishing his public 
image as a benefactor of Islam. 
 
Compared with their counterparts from the lesser khanate of Balkh, envoys from Bukhara 
received somewhat higher favours at Aurangzeb’s court. Khwaja Ahmad, the envoy of Abdul 
Aziz Khan who arrived in November 1661, was met in the environs of Delhi by Saif Khan, 
court favourite and governor of the capital, and conducted into the Am-Khas, the splendid 
Hall of Public Audience constructed by Shah Jahan (Fig 9.2).
51
. A total of 120,000 rupees was 
expended on Khwaja Ahmad’s entertainment during his three-month stay, and in 1667 two 
lakhs were spent on his successor Rustam Bey. Aurangzeb also sent his own ambassadors in 
return, such as Mustafa Khan who was dispatched in June 1664 with presents worth 150,000 
rupees for Abdul Aziz Khan and 100,000 rupees for Subhan Quli Khan, respectively.
52
 In 
keeping with imperial protocol, the Uzbek ambassadors were ushered into the royal presence 
by an official appointed for the purpose. They were required to perform the Mughal act of 
obedience known as taslim; placing one’s right hand on the ground and then raising it gently 
and placing it on one’s head, a gesture expressing submission to imperial authority.53 The 
diplomatic letter they carried was taken from their hands by an amir (high-ranking nobleman) 
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who then delivered it to the emperor or read out its contents to him.
54
 Only the Persian 
ambassador Budaq Beg is said to have been allowed to present his sovereign’s letter directly 
to Aurangzeb, who reportedly raised it above his head as a particular mark of respect before 
consulting its contents.
55
 
<FIGURE 9.2 HERE> 
 
The welcome given to Budaq Beg was the grandest reception accorded to any ambassador to 
India during Aurangzeb’s reign. From the moment he crossed the Safavid-Mughal border, 
provincial governors fêted the envoy. Outside Delhi he was warmly received by prominent 
courtiers who conducted him towards the Am-Khas.
56
 As powerful political rivals sharing 
close cultural and historic ties, the Mughals and Safavids turned ambassadorial exchanges into 
conspicuous displays of opulence and refinement. Such diplomatic trials of strength often 
contained barely concealed attempts to attain symbolic precedence, such as when Shah Abbas 
II in his letter to Aurangzeb referred to the assistance that  his ancestor Shah Tahmasp had 
given to the exiled Mughal emperor Humayun over a century earlier.
57
 The large amounts of 
gifts which both parties exchanged were intended as expressions of their masters’ power and 
prosperity.
58
 In 1661, the presents brought from Iran included sixty-six horses and a pearl 
weighing thirty-seven carats, representing a total value of 422,000 rupees. On his part, 
                                                          
54
 Bernier, Travels, pp. 117-18. 
55
 This claim, made by Bernier (Travels, pp. 119, 147), has been accepted by modern authorities: Islam, Indo-
Persian Relations, pp. 125-6; Farooqi, ‘Diplomacy’, 84. 
56
 Maāsir-i-‘Alamgiri, p. 21. 
57
 Islam, Indo-Persian relations, p. 125 
58
 Farooqi, ‘Diplomacy’, 81. 
19 
 
Aurangzeb bestowed an elaborate set of items worth 535,000 rupees on Budaq Beg, and two 
years later sent an embassy to Isfahan with presents worth as much as seven lakhs.
59
  
 
Van Adrichem’s embassy did not come close to these dimensions. As discussed in detail in 
Birkenholz’s contribution, the Dutch presented Arabian horses, fine textiles, sword blades, 
birds of paradise, and an extensive variety of Japanese lacquer works and other rarities.
60
 The 
combined value of gifts to Aurangzeb and a range of courtiers and officials nevertheless did 
not exceed 27,500 guilders, out of a total expenditure of some 63,500 guilders (or around 
53,000 rupees) on the mission as a whole.
61
 It is clear that the Dutch merchant-diplomats 
could not and would not compete on the level of royalty, which also would not have been 
expected from representatives of a minor political player with ambiguous sovereign 
credentials. All the same, the Company consciously selected its gifts in accordance with 
Mughal custom and elite tastes, demonstrating its understanding of local conventions while 
showcasing its distinctive character as a supplier of exotic luxury goods. Although relatively 
few in number and excluding cash sums, the gifts bestowed on Van Adrichem also 
unquestionably belonged to the classic Mughal repertoire; they included horses, jewelled 
daggers, and robes of honour.
62
 A number of discrepancies notwithstanding – principally the 
lack of reciprocity in Mughal-Dutch diplomatic exchange – Van Adrichem’s embassy 
therefore to an important extent resembled those of other political actors in the Indian Ocean 
world. 
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The Question of Commensurability 
The profound differences between Van Adrichem’s reception and that of Budaq Beg had less 
to do with cultural differences or the incommensurability of diplomatic traditions than with 
concrete interests of state. Once the merchant-diplomat obtained his impatiently-awaited 
audience, his treatment followed standard Mughal practice and resembled that of other 
representatives of smaller powers, such as the Uzbeks. Nor did the Dutchman appear out of 
place or hesitant about the role he was expected to perform. Before coming to court, Van 
Adrichem had solicited letters of recommendation from Surat’s governor Mustafa Khan and 
the governor of Ahmedabad, Makramat Khan.
63
 In Delhi, the ambassador and his broker 
Kishan Das were closely advised by a small number of courtiers, principally the ahadi Sultan 
Muhammad and the Akthah Begi Iftikhar Khan. The latter served as liaison with wazirs Raja 
Raghunath and Fazil Khan, and he appears to have been put in charge of entertaining the 
embassy party.
64
 Iftikhar Khan had aided VOC affairs as early as 1648, while his father, the 
late Asalat Khan, had been an important patron of the Dutch since the 1630s.
65
 While 
Company agents could thus tap into an archive of past experiences;  the Mughal 
administration also drew upon a well-established prior frame of reference. Upon hearing of 
the arrival of the Dutch party, Fazil Khan first inquired after the late Joan Berckhout, before 
calling up Tack to clarify Van Adrichem’s status in relation to his predecessors. Being 
satisfied that the current ambassador was commissioned directly by the Hoge Regering, Fazil 
Khan proceeded to arrange his reception accordingly.
66
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Van Adrichem obtained his first audience on 14 September 1662. Returning from a two-week 
retreat outside Delhi, the emperor announced that he would receive the envoy that evening 
when holding court in the Ghusl-Khana. Iftikhar Khan called the small Dutch company into 
the square in front of the audience hall and ensured that the horses and other gifts were lined 
up in the same place. Being instructed to enter, Van Adrichem, the merchant (koopman) Joan 
Elpen, and the secretary Fernandinus de Laver ‘humbly offered the required obedience after 
this country’s fashion’, and presented the Persian and Dutch copies of Maetsuycker’s letter to 
one of Aurangzeb’s confidants, who conveyed them into the emperor’s hands. Unlike the 
epistle carried by Budaq Beg, the VOC’s letters were neither opened nor read in the presence 
of the ambassador. The diplomatic gifts having been shown from a distance, the three 
Dutchmen were dressed in honorific attire and once again went through the set procedures of 
expressing gratitude according to imperial protocol, before obtaining license to depart.
67
 
Three more presentations of gifts followed over the following weeks, each time in the Am-
Khas, before Van Adrichem was granted his departure audience on 22 October. 
 
This final audience is most instructive about Van Adrichem’s participation in two key Mughal 
ceremonies. Once Aurangzeb’s appearance on the throne was announced by the sound of 
kettle-drums and other musical instruments, Van Adrichem joined the other attendees in the 
Am-Khas in doing reverence to the emperor before each took their appointed place. As the 
positioning in Mughal audience halls was spatially stratified according to rank, it is 
regrettable that Van Adrichem’s secretary did not note down his exact spot. However, from a 
previous audience we know that the ambassador was made to stand in the section lined by a 
red wooden railing which was preserved for medium to low-ranked mansabdars (office-
holders), while he was only called up into the area within the silver fence that was the 
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preserve of high-ranking nobles during the presentation of his gifts.
68
 After informing the 
emperor about the VOC’s request, Fazil Khan took Van Adrichem by the hand and led him to 
the place for the dressing in robes of honour. Clad in the sarapa, the envoy took position in 
the Am-Khas in front of the stairs facing the throne, ‘four times bringing his hand from the 
earth to his head’.69 This manner of saluting, in the words of Akbar’s wazir Abul Fazl, 
signified that the person ‘is ready to give himself as an offering’.70 As the audience unfolded, 
Iftikhar Khan placed a jewelled dagger (khanjar) on Van Adrichem’s head and the reins of a 
horse with a gilded saddle around his neck. Upon receiving each item the ambassador went 
through the routine of taslim four times in succession, as he did a fourth time when the 
emperor turned his eyes towards him. Later that day, having received a farman from the hands 
of Fazil Khan, the three Dutch representatives once more performed the prescribed ritual.
71
 
 
Of particular interest are the commentaries inserted by De Laver. The secretary emphasized 
how Aurangzeb had passed the khanjar ‘from his own hands’ to Iftikhar Khan, and pointed 
out that the emperor focused his gaze intently on the envoy.
72
 The extent to which the 
importance accorded to the VOC representative might have been inflated is of lesser 
relevance here than the fact that the Dutch measured the significance of the treatment they 
received by what they understood to be the standards of their hosts. In their ritual performance 
as in their written requests, they adhered to the language of submission to imperial authority, a 
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compliant stance which was distinctive of (if not exclusive to) merchant-diplomats.
73
 Like 
VOC envoys before and after them, Van Adrichem’s embassy party displayed no misgivings 
about accepting robes of honour from the emperor and various nobles, regardless of the 
implications of authority and service connected with this symbolic act of incorporation.
74
 
They offered ceremonial offerings of gold and silver coins (nazr) to Aurangzeb, did reverence 
‘after the Moorish fashion’ even when wearing European dress, and ‘requested to enjoy the 
honour of presenting their humble service’ to noblemen such as Muhammad Amin Khan, son 
of Mir Jumla.
75
 The emperor’s letter and khil’at sent to Batavia were received with highly 
elaborate public spectacle, while analogous references to humble supplication at the foot of 
Aurangzeb’s throne are found in Maetsuycker’s letter to the monarch and in the farmans 
issued in response. The emperor’s reminder to Batavia of the protection his farmans extended 
to Maetsuycker’s delegates, as long as they comported themselves worthily in their offices, 
suggests that the reciprocal discourse about service functioned as a means to pacify the Dutch 
in exchange for commercial privileges.
76
 
 
Further evidence of commensurability is found in a wide variety of situations, ranging from 
the adoption of social practices to the shared use of generic religious differences. In their 
letter to Aurangzeb, the members of the Hoge Regering wrote that ‘God Almighty’ had called 
the monarch to the Mughal throne, and that they prayed that ‘the Lord of Heaven and Earth’ 
would abundantly bless both his person and his empire.
77
 Agreeing with the dictum by the 
Sufi poet Amir Khusrau inscribed on the walls of the Ghusl-Khana, De Laver too described 
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the palace at Shahjahanabad as an ‘earthly paradise’.78 No doubt aided by this compatible 
repertoire of commonplaces, the mediation of difference in Mughal-Dutch encounters took 
shape through inter-personal relations. Van Adrichem’s diplomatic activity included meetings 
with some of the VOC’s long-standing contacts, among others the aged Haqiqat Khan and the 
former governor of Surat, Raushan Zamir. When the latter visited the Dutch in their lodge in 
Delhi, they demonstrated their awareness of Mughal social etiquette by presenting him with 
the traditional parting treat of pan (a stimulant prepared of betel leaf with areca nut) and 
rosewater.
79
 Finally, non-ambassadorial actors played a key role in sustaining diplomatic 
networks. During Van Adrichem’s embassy, a minor yet interesting part was reserved for the 
German surgeon Jacob Fredrik Baertsch. When the mission ended, Baertsch remained in 
Delhi to continue his treatment of the nobleman Hoshdar Khan, being expected to use the 
opportunity to sustain the Dutch lobby through the influence of his new patron.
80
 
 
The final means to evaluate Van Adrichem’s mission is to consider it alongside diplomatic 
representations made on behalf of other merchant corporations. The English East India 
Company (EIC) chose not to send a congratulatory embassy to Aurangzeb. Having awaited 
the outcome of the VOC’s mission, the directors in London concluded that the gains from 
procuring new farmans were not likely to justify the expenses of a courtly venture.
81
 Instead, 
the English aimed to renew existing privileges through local diplomacy, and in 1664 sent 
William Blake, the chief factor in Hugli, to nawab Shaista Khan’s court in Rajmahal.82 In 
contrast, a small French delegation did attend Aurangzeb’s court, when François de la 
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Boullaye le Gouz and Beber, representatives of the French crown and the Compagnie des 
Indes Orientales respectively, arrived in Agra in the summer of 1666. Tavernier, who gives 
the fullest account of this undertaking, describes how it was marred by a lack of familiarity 
with Mughal court customs and an unwillingness to adjust to foreign protocol. It was 
Boullaye’s foolish insistence on delivering Louis XIV’s letter personally to the emperor, the 
traveller argued, which nearly led to the failure of the mission.
83
  
 
Tavernier’s message was clear: European envoys in Mughal India needed to adjust to local 
conventions in order to succeed, a position underwritten by Bernier in 1668.
84
 Both men 
effectively advocated a course of action which VOC envoys such as Van Adrichem had long 
been practicing. Deftly exploiting the greater range of diplomatic approaches available to 
them as representatives of an emergent Company-state centred on Batavia, the VOC’s 
merchant-diplomats displayed accommodative stances which contrasted sharply with the 
more rigid and circumscribed diplomatic conduct of Boullaye’s fellow royal ambassadors, 
Thomas Roe and William Norris.
85
 
 
Conclusion 
A focus on the merchant-diplomats representing the Dutch East India Company opens up a 
significantly different perspective on cross-cultural diplomacy in early modern Asia than the 
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picture obtained from existing studies about the occasional royal ambassadors sent from other 
parts of Europe. Struggling to balance the EIC’s interests with his duty to the crown, the 
Jacobean courtier Thomas Roe had felt notoriously uncomfortable about receiving robes of 
honour and refused to perform taslim.
86
 Yet it was the incompatibility of two concepts of 
diplomatic honour that  dogged the English envoy, not the complete inability to grasp the 
logics of a different cultural system. By conceiving of VOC diplomacy in Asia as anchored in 
interactions within the Indian Ocean world, as this chapter has, one is able to move beyond 
the thesis of cultural incommensurability in Euro-Indian diplomatic exchange.  
 
By approaching embassies not as one-off events but as moments in an on-going diplomatic 
relationship, one can recognize how courtly encounters were rooted in a complex 
constellation of political relations at the local level.  Van Adrichem and other VOC envoys 
were relatively familiar with Mughal social and political conventions, well-connected through 
networks of imperial patronage, and willing to symbolically submit to imperial authority. Free 
from the burden of upholding the honour of a faraway monarch and representing a foreign yet 
familiar community which petitioned the emperor following established Mughal procedures, 
the VOC’s merchant-diplomats were readily incorporated into an existing configuration of 
hierarchic relations on terms set by their powerful hosts. Seen from this angle, the foreign 
trading company often appears in the shape of a domestic actor, one that could be called upon 
to perform the duties of a vassal. 
 
Like other non-ambassadorial actors – including the European surgeons and Indian brokers 
regularly employed by the VOC – merchants played a significant role in inter-state relations. 
A focus on the merchant-diplomat hence sheds additional light on the wide and flexible range 
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of formal and informal means of dealing between early modern polities.  In highlighting the 
Indian Ocean as a space for research on cross-cultural diplomacy, along the lines of analyses 
pioneered with regard to the Mediterranean, this chapter moreover contributes to the recent 
shift away from an exclusive focus on Christian Europe in investigating the development of 
early modern diplomacy, proposing to push it one step further by incorporating Asian 
encounters into this widening perspective. 
 
So what does the comparison of a Dutch mission to Aurangzeb’s court with its west and 
central Asian counterparts tell us? When seen against other envoys arriving in Delhi during 
the 1660s, it is evident that the treatment accorded to Van Adrichem by the Mughal court was 
modest. The envoy’s reception was postponed up to three times, the Dutch party received 
hardly any material support during its stay in the capital, and when attending the Am-Khas its 
normal position was within the red wooden railing, not the silver-coloured fence. However, 
the way the Dutch were treated seems not to have differed essentially from that of other 
representatives of minor political actors. Van Adrichem’s manner of presentation in the Am-
Khas, his dressing in robes of honour, and the gifts bestowed upon him, all conformed closely 
to the conventions of Mughal court culture. The items which the Dutch chose to present did so 
too. Existing discrepancies appeared to have more to do with geopolitical interests than with 
cultural incommensurability. Further examination of cross-cultural diplomacy will need to test 
this hypothesis, to start by comparing diplomatic encounters in Mughal India with those at the 
Ottoman, Safavid, and other Eurasian courts. Yet the case analyzed in this chapter suggests 
that in terms of adjusting to foreign customs, the differences of diplomatic approach between 
seventeenth-century merchant-diplomats such as Van Adrichem and royal ambassadors such 
as Roe may well have been more profound than those between the former and, say, 
representatives of Balkh or Basra. 
